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PARTICIPATION OF MARRIED WOMEN IN THE LABOUR 











In this paper, we estimate labour participation equations for married women for eleven 
European countries, using data from the European Community Household Panel 
corresponding to the years 1994, 1995 and 1996. The main objective of our study is to 
test whether the “added worker effect” holds. From our results it can be concluded that 
the labour market participation of the married woman basically depends on her personal 
and family characteristics, her non-wage income and her potential earnings. In only a 
few countries does the participation of married women seem to be related to the work 
status of the husband. However, the consistently significant and negative effect of the 
woman’s non-wage income (basically the husband’s wage) prevents the “added worker 
effect” from being completely rejected as a hypothesis. It seems, therefore, that female 
labour market participation continues to have a “secondary” role in the family sphere in 
some European countries. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The labour market participation of married women has a range of special features which 
justify a separate analysis for this group from that of other collectives. Some of these 
features, such as the “added worker effect”, are common to many countries and have 
been the object of much research. This effect, well described in the literature, has 
basically to do with the decision of a married woman, inactive in the labour force, to 
temporarily participate in the labour market when faced with the loss of her husband’s 
job
1. This supposes that the woman assumes a “secondary” role as far as the labour 
supply of the family is concerned
2. However, the labour market behaviour of women 
has changed noticeably in recent years
3. In the majority of European countries, women 
have gone on to become fully integrated in the labour market on equal conditions with 
men. The changes have come about at such speed in certain countries (for example, the 
south of Europe) that there is a need to study the determinants of female labour market 
participation using recent data bases, in particular those which provide sufficiently rich 
and varied information on the personal, family and labour characteristics of women. 
With a view to this, the present study attempts to reveal the determinants of female 
labour market participation in eleven European countries, using information provided 
by the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for the years 1994, 1995 and 
1996. In particular, we try to verify whether the “added worker hypothesis” has been 
fulfilled or not, and thereby reveal whether the husband’s labour market situation has 
any significant influence on the wife’s labour market behaviour. 
 
The use of this database provides undoubted advantages. In the first place, the 
fact that it is a panel means that the longitudinal information on the set of individuals 
surveyed allows us to deal satisfactorily with the problem of unobservable 
heterogeneity. Secondly, the methodology of the survey is common to all the countries 
analysed, making any comparison reliable. Finally, the panel structure of our data set 
will allow us to observe the “added worker effect” over time more accurately, since this 
                                                             
1 As Maloney (1991) points out, the origin of this concept can be traced to the 1940s and 1960s in work 
by authors such as Humphrey (1940), Woytinski (1940), Hansen (1961), Bowen and Finegan (1965) and 
Cain (1966).  
2 Prieto and Rodríguez (2000), for example, reach this conclusion in the Spanish case, based on 
information provided by a labour survey carried out in 1991.  
3 In fact, there are many studies which call the added worker hypothesis into question in various 
countries. See for example, García (1991), Maloney (1991) and Micklewright and Giannelli (1991).   3
effect can be considered a temporary response of the wife behaviour to changes in her 
husband labour status. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the 
econometric method used to estimate the labour market participation equations of the 
married woman. In Section 3, the participation equations for those countries for which 
information is included in the first three waves of the ECHP are estimated, with special 
attention given to the measurement of the effect of the husband’s labour market status 
on the woman’s labour supply. Finally, in Section 4 we give a summary of the 
conclusions we have reached.  
 
II. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
The method we use to analyse the determinants of the labour market participation of the 
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Equation (1) is a participation function for married women where the dependent 
variable, yit, is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the woman participates in 
the labour market (working or seeking work) and 0 if she does not participate.  
 
The decision to participate depends on a vector of exogenous variables, Xit, 
which includes the personal and family characteristics of the woman, her non-wage 
income and the characteristics of the labour market. Besides these variables, another 
element that determines participation is the woman’s potential wage, logwit, which is 
clearly of an endogenous nature and which basically depends on a set of human capital   4
variables, Zit. This endogeneity requires use of the instrumental variable technique, and 
we therefore estimate equation (2) and then introduce the predicted wage values into the 
participation equation, (1), as one explanatory variable more. 
 
Finally, the model includes a set of variables which show the labour situation of 
the husband, Sit. Their coefficients tell us whether, ceteris paribus, this labour situation 
or status (working, unemployed or inactive) has an influence on the woman’s behaviour 
with respect to the labour market. As a result, these coefficients, together with the non-
wage income variable (basically, the husband’s wage), will allow us to know whether 
the woman’s labour market behaviour is of a “secondary” character with regard to her 
husband and whether the “added worker hypothesis” holds or not.  
 
It should be taken into account that the estimation of the wage equation (2) 
presents, in principle, a difficulty. Given that we only observe the wage of those women 
who have previously decided to participate in the labour market (that is to say, those 
women whose reservation wage is below the wage offer that they receive), it is to be 
expected that there is a self-selection bias in the sample used. To deal with this, 
following the procedure described by Heckman (1976) we need to estimate, beforehand, 
a participation model which would allow us to incorporate the Inverse Mills ratio with a 
view to correcting this self-selection bias. However, the estimations of the wage 
equations presented in Section 3 do not contain the Inverse Mills ratio due to the fact 
that this ratio turned out to be significant for hardly any of the countries analysed. We 
can thus affirm that there is no self-selection bias in the sample analysed
4.  
 




As we have already mentioned, we use the ECHP to analyse the determinants of 
the married woman’s labour market participation. This database contains labour data on 
individuals belonging to twelve European countries, with three waves available at 
                                                             
4 The estimations of the wage equations which contain the Inverse Mills ratio are not displayed in this 
article but are available for consultation.  Only in the case of two countries (Spain and France) is this ratio 
significant, though its sign is negative.  Due to this, in these two cases we preferred to use the estimations 
which were not corrected for bias.   5
present (1994, 1995 and 1996)
5. The information is homogenous across the countries 
which appear in the Panel, as the questionnaire is the same and the elaboration process 
of the survey is co-ordinated by EUROSTAT. Given the nature of our study, we have 
used the balanced panel defined by the sub-sample of married women, active as well as 
inactive, the size of which obviously varies from country to country. For this group we 
have singled out information on personal characteristics (age, work experience, length 
of time in the firm and level of studies), wages, labour situation, family income from 
sources other than the woman, periods of unemployment over recent years, number of 
small children and, where possible, region of residence. Information on her husband has 
also been extracted (labour situation, level of studies, whether or not he receives 
unemployment benefits and whether he contributes to household tasks). 
 
Table 1 contains information on the labour participation rates of men, women 
and married women according to the ECHP. It can be observed that female participation 
rates vary noticeably across countries, generally being higher in northern European 
countries than in southern ones. Moreover, female participation is always lower than 
that of males. Finally, the participation of married women, except in the cases of 
Portugal, Belgium and Denmark, is lower than that of women as a whole.  
 
The exact definitions of each of the variables used in the estimation are given in 
Table 2. Tables A.1.a-f in the Appendix contain the descriptive statistics of the variables 
corresponding to the samples used to estimate the participation equations, as well as the 
reduced samples of married women who work which have been used to estimate the 




The fact that we are using a panel data set has allowed us to estimate, in the case 
of the wage equations as well as the participation equation, a random effects model
6. 
                                                             
5 Estimations for one of the countries which forms part of the ECHP, Luxembourg, are not included due 
to the small size of the corresponding sample.  
6 Either wage equations and probit models present serious problems when they are estimated by a fixed 
effects approach. Firstly, fixed effects models do not allow to make forecast outside the sample, as we 
need to do in our case. Secondly, fixed effects models could not be estimated when relevant variables do 
not change over time (as in the case of the educational level). Finally, “probit model does not lend itself 
well to the fixed effects treatment. There is no feasible way to remove the heterogeneity, and with a large   6
Hence, the error terms in equations (1) and (2) will have two components: a random 
disturbance characterising each observation and constant through time (the random 
effect) and a random disturbance varying through time and individuals. As pointed out 
in Section 2, we need to calculate the predicted or potential wage of the married woman, 
equation (2), before estimating the labour participation model, equation (1). The wage 
equation has only been estimated for the sample of married women who are working, 
given that they are the only group for which wages are known. The dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of hourly wages, LHW, measured in real terms. With regard to 
the explanatory variables, we have included those which reflect the individual’s 
endowment of human capital. Moreover, a set of regional dummy variables has been 
included, wherever possible, to control for any singular or particular characteristics that 
the various labour sub-markets may have
7. Finally, two dummy variables for the years 
1995 and 1996 have been included in order to capture the impact of factors common to 
all individuals but which vary from year to year, such as the evolution of the rate of 
aggregate unemployment or the economic cycle. 
 
It is important to point out that though the survey offers information on other 
variables which could be incorporated into the wage equation (for example, 
occupational category and sector), this would generate serious biases. The reason is that 
the necessity, in the participation probit, to attribute a potential wage to all the women 
in the sample means that the set of variables which are candidates for inclusion in the 
wage equation must satisfy the restriction that there is information on these variables for 
all observations in the probit sample. In the case of occupation, for example, it is not 
possible to assign a value to this variable for those women who have never worked and 
hence wage predictions for these women can not be obtained if occupation is included 
in the wage equation. With regard to length of time in the firm, on the other hand, it is 
possible to assign a value of zero to those women not presently working. 
 
The following have been included in the first group of variables: level of studies, 
measured by the dummy variables EDUC1 (university studies) and EDUC2 (secondary 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
number of cross-sectional units, estimation of the ai’s (fixed effects) is intractable” (Greene, 2000, p. 
837). 
7 In the cases of Germany, Denmark and Holland, the survey does not provide information on the region 
from which the respondent comes.  For this reason, we have not been able to incorporate regional 
dummies in these cases.   7
school studies); potential experience (present age minus age when started work) and the 
square of this variable (POTEXP and POTEXP2); length of time in the firm and the 
square of this (SEN and SEN2); and finally, number of periods of unemployment over 
the previous five years (UNEMP5). The first two variables capture the impact that 
investment in formal education has on the individual’s wage, and this is expected to 
take a positive sign in both cases as the reference category is possession of primary 
level studies or lower. The potential experience tries to measure the effect of investment 
by the individual in post-schooling training, while the length of time in the company is 
more a measure of on the job training. The inclusion of the square of both variables 
allows us to test for a parabolic relationship with wages
8. Lastly, the number of periods 
of unemployment over the last five years tries to capture the loss of human capital 
resulting from lack of activity and its relationship with wages is therefore expected to be 
negative.  
 
The random effects estimations of the wage equations appear in Tables 3.a-c. 
These tables display the values of a Lagrange multiplier test for the random effects 
model, developed by Breusch and Pagan (1980), based on the OLS residuals. Under the 
null hypothesis (non individual effect) this statistic is distributed as chi-squared with 
one degree of freedom. The null hypothesis can be rejected for all the countries in our 
sample. This result suggests that random individual effects cannot be neglected, and that 
random effects models are more efficient than OLS. 
 
 The results show that the possession of university or secondary studies 
significantly raises the woman’s wage in relation to the reference category (primary 
studies), the effect of university studies being the greatest for all countries. It is 
noteworthy, however, that the effect of education on wages does not have the same 
intensity in all cases. The effect is greater – around double – in the southern countries 
(Portugal, Italy, Spain, Greece and France) and in the UK and Ireland, than in Germany, 
Denmark, Holland and Belgium. There is much greater variability across countries with 
regard to the relationship between wages and both the potential experience and length of 
time in the firm. In the case of potential experience, only in Germany, the UK and Spain 
                                                             
8 Labour income rises with experience and length of time in the job up to a certain number of years, but 
then the human capital acquired through experience may depreciate at a faster rate than it accumulates 
and hence it is possible that wages decrease.    8
can a (very weak) parabolic relationship be noted. A relationship between wages and the 
length of time in the company appears only in the cases of Italy and Holland, being 
weaker in the latter of these. The negative effect on wages of the depreciation of human 
capital resulting from periods of unemployment appears to be more general, being 
significant in every country apart from France, Greece, Portugal and Belgium. As far as 
time effects are concerned, we see that there is a significant increase in real wages 
during the years 1995 and 1996 with respect to 1994 in all cases except the UK and 
Portugal in 1995, Greece in 1996 and Italy in 1995 and 1996. This could be as a result 
of the economic recovery initiated midway through the decade.  
 
From the coefficients of the wage equation we can estimate the predicted values 
of potential wages for each of the individuals making up the sample. This variable will 
be included in the participation probit, along with the rest of the variables mentioned in 
Section 2. 
  
Tables 4.a-c show the estimations of the random effects participation model for 
the different European countries. Note that the parameter rho included in the tables 
shows the correlation between the errors corresponding to the same individual over 
different periods. It is significant in every case, implying the existence of a random 
effect of individual character which confirms that the random effects model is 
appropriate. 
 
The dependent variable, ACTIVE, is a dichotomous variable which takes the 
value 1 when the married woman is working or looking for work (active) and 0 
otherwise. The explanatory variables are grouped into five blocks. The first set of 
variables is comprised of the total income of the family excluding the woman’s wage 
(that is, the woman’s non-wage income), FIEW, the woman’s predicted or potential 
wage estimated from the wage equations, PREW, and a dummy variable which shows 
whether the husband receives unemployment benefits, BENEFIH. Our estimation shows 
that the coefficients of the first two variables are significant and have the expected 
signs. The woman’s labour participation increases with her potential wage and 
decreases when her non-wage income increases. FIEW can include different types of 
income but the main component is the husband’s wage (if he is working) or his 
unemployment benefit (if he is unemployed). Consequently, the negative sign on FIEW   9
shows that there is an important income effect in the labour participation decision of the 
married woman. However, given that the impact of FIEW on the variable ACTIVE is 
calculated taking as given, among other things, the labour situation of the husband, the 
most likely thing is that these changes in non-wage income are due to variations in the 
husband’s income which do not arise from changes in his labour situation. In this sense, 
the strong income effect detected in the participation equations does not constitute a 
round proof that the “added worker hypothesis” holds but it does reflect the 
“dependent” character of female labour market participation in so far as it shows that 
this participation varies with the husband’s income.  
 
The variable BENEFIH, which shows if the husband receives unemployment 
benefits, does not turn out to be significant in the estimations. It is possible that the 
universality of the benefit system in the majority of European countries makes this 
effect barely noticeable. 
 
The second set of variables is comprised of personal characteristics, such as age, 
AGE, the square of this, AGE2, the level of studies of the woman, EDUC1 and EDUC2, 
and that of her husband, EDUC1H and EDUC2H. The signs on AGE and AGE2 show 
that the relation between age and female labour market participation takes an inverted-U 
form in all countries except Portugal, Ireland and Belgium. That is, female participation 
grows up to a certain age and decreases thereafter, probably due to the need to assume 
certain family responsibilities. Regarding the variables which represent the level of 
studies, EDUC1 and EDUC2 are significant and their coefficients have a negative sign 
in all countries except Spain and Holland. This result could appear to be strange, as 
labour market participation would be expected to increase with the level of education
9. 
However, the fact that the participation equation includes the potential wage of the 
woman could justify the result obtained. What the equations show, in fact, is that for a 
given predicted wage (close to the market wage) the probability of participation is 
smaller when the level of qualifications is greater. This makes sense because the 
woman’s reservation wage rises as the level of studies increases and, for a given 
predicted wage, it is more likely that the reservation wage is above the wage offer 
received, thus reducing the probability of participation. On the other hand, the level of 
                                                             
9 This positive effect has been observed, for example, by Maloney (1991) for the case of the US. 
   10
education of the husband, EDUC1H and EDUC2H, seems to be more weakly related to 
female participation. Thus, in countries such as Denmark, Holland, France, Italy, 
Belgium and Ireland, female labour market participation increases significantly with the 
husband’s schooling, though this is not the case for Germany, Greece, UK and Spain.  
 
The third block of variables describes the family-related determining factors in 
the decision to participate. Firstly, a dummy variable, DUMHW, is used to indicate 
whether the husband works in the home looking after the children or other dependent 
persons. Secondly, two variables are included to try to capture the influence of family 
responsibilities on female labour participation. The first, DUMN12, is a dummy 
variable which takes the value one if the woman has children less than twelve years old. 
The second, N14, is a numerical variable which indicates the number of children less 
than fourteen years old. The results obtained show that only in the case of UK, Spain 
and Ireland does female labour market participation increase noticeably when the 
husband participates in household tasks. This general lack of significance of DUMHW 
may be due to its character as a dummy variable in that it does not provide any 
information about the number of hours that the husband dedicates to taking care of the 
children, but merely informs us whether the husband participates in household duties or 
not. Given that the participation of husbands in household tasks verges on the universal 
in the majority of European countries, this should not be an important determining 
factor in female participation. As the number of children under fourteen years old rises, 
female labour market participation decreases, as was to be expected in all countries. The 
effect of the dummy variable DUMN12 is, however, less clear, perhaps because the 
variable N14 has robbed it of part of its influence. 
 
Finally, the labour situation of the husband is captured through two dummy 
variables, UNEMPH and INACTH, and two interaction terms of these variables with 
age, UNEMPH*AGE and INACTH*AGE. The first variable takes the value 1 when the 
husband is unemployed, and the second variable when he is inactive
10. Thus, the 
coefficients of the variables UNEMPH and INACTH tell us whether or not there is a 
significant difference in the probability of the woman participating when the husband is 
unemployed or inactive compared to the case where the husband is working. If these 
coefficients are positive and significant, then it is more probable that married women   11
participate when their husbands are unemployed or inactive than when they are 
working. One could consider that this would confirm the “added worker hypothesis”, 
but it needs to be taken into account that what the coefficients of UNEMPH and 
INACTH in fact show is the effect of the husband’s labour situation on the wife’s 
labour market behaviour given the non-wage income of the wife, FIEW. (Note that this 
variable is controlled for in the equation). Consequently, in order to check the “added 
worker hypothesis” we must simultaneously consider the effects of the variables 
UNEMPH, INACTH and FIEW. The first two show the possible “qualitative” effects of 
the hypothesis, an example of which would be the consequences for female 
participation of having more time free from family responsibilities and having lower 
expectations of having a high family income when the husband is unemployed or 
inactive. The last shows, as we have already indicated, the existence of an income effect 
which could be generated by reasons other than a simple change in the labour situation 
of the husband from being working to becoming unemployed or inactive.  
 
As far as the interaction terms are concerned, we are trying to capture the fact 




The results obtained in the estimations seem to indicate that the “added worker 
effect” is detected for very few countries. Only in Italy does strong evidence of this 
phenomenon seem to exist. In the cases of Germany, Spain, Portugal and Holland, the 
husband being inactive appears to stimulate the woman’s labour supply but this supply 
is not affected by her husband being unemployed. Ireland, on the other hand, represents 
the polar opposite in that the probability of female participation diminishes if the 
husband is either unemployed or inactive. Moreover, for those countries where the 
“added worker effect” is detected, albeit weakly, it is observed that the effect diminishes 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
10 The reference category is where the husband is working. 
11 To be exact, the marginal effect of UNEMPH on ACTIVE is equal to the coefficient of UNEMPH plus 
the coefficient of the interaction term UNEMPH*AGE multiplied by AGE.  If the first coefficient is 
positive and the second negative and lower than the first, the stimulating effect on female participation of 
the husband being unemployed of inactive decreases progressively with age.    12
with age. As was to be expected, there is evidence that the younger the woman, the 





In this piece of research we have estimated various labour participation equations for 
married women, using data from the European Community Household Panel 
corresponding to the years 1994, 1995 and 1996.  
 
Given that one of the most important determining factors in labour market 
participation is the potential earnings of the woman, we have estimated wage equations 
which yield us the expected or predicted wage before estimating the participation 
equations. The inspiration for these equations is the Theory of Human Capital, and the 
main determinants of wages are considered to be education and work experience. Once 
the expected wage is found, it is included as an additional explanatory variable in the 
participation equations. 
 
In these equations it is considered that the woman is participating in the labour 
market when she is active (working or unemployed). The results of the estimations 
carried out allow it to be concluded that the woman’s labour market participation 
basically depends on her personal and family characteristics, her non-wage income and 
her potential earnings. Only in very few countries does the female labour market 
participation seem to be linked to the labour situation of the husband. However, the 
negative and significant effect, found for all the countries analysed, of the woman’s 
non-wage income (basically the husband’s wage) prevents us from being able to 
completely reject the “added worker hypothesis”. It seems that female labour market 
participation continues to have something of a “secondary” character in the family set-
up given that participation is very dependent on other family earnings. 
 
                                                             
12 More specifically, for the countries referred to in the previous paragraph the stimulus provided by the 
husband being unemployed or inactive decreases gradually until the woman reaches the age of around 
forty.  From there on, it becomes even negative.   13
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TABLE 1 
Participation rates by sex in Europe 
(percentages) 
 
  Men  Women  Married women 
       
       
BELGIUM  77.6  61.5  63.9 
DENMARK  85.4  76.2  80.5 
FRANCE  71.2  56.6  56.4 
GERMANY  80.6  57.5  52.5 
UNITED KINGDOM  84.2  56.8  55.2 
GREECE  79.9  47.6  44.5 
IRELAND  83.2  42.0  33.0 
ITALY  76.4  45.4  41.5 
HOLLAND  77.7  52.8  49.4 
PORTUGAL  80.7  55.4  56.6 
SPAIN  74.5  39.5  33.6 
       
 










   
LHW  natural logarithm of the woman’s hourly real wage (in Euros) 
EDUC1  =1 if the woman has university studies; else=0 
EDUC2  =1 if the woman has secondary school studies; else=0 
POTEXP  potential experience (present age-age when started work) 
POTEXP2  square of potential experience 
SEN  seniority (years of experience at the current firm, if the woman is working, or 
at the last job, if the woman is unemployed. If the woman has never worked, 
its value is zero) 
SEN2  square of seniority 
UNEMP5  number of unemployment periods over the previous five years 
ACTIVE  =1 if the woman works or is unemployed; else=0 
PREW 
 
natural logarithm of the woman's predicted (potential) hourly wage (in Euros) 
FIEW  family monthly income excluded the woman's wage (in Euros) (it includes 
the husband’s wage, benefits and property income)  
AGE  the woman’s age  
AGE2  square of the woman’s age 
EDUC1H  =1 if the husband has university studies; else=0 
EDUC2H  =1 if the husband has secondary school studies; else=0 
BENEFIH  =1 if the husband receives unemployment benefits; else=0 
UNEMPH  =1 if the husband is unemployed; else=0 
INACTH  =1 if the husband is inactive; else=0 
DUMHW  =1 if the husband works in the home looking after the children or other 
dependent persons; else=0 
N14  number of children younger than 14 years old 
DUMN12  =1 if the woman has children less than twelve years old; else=0 
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TABLE 3.a 
 
Wage equation estimates (Random effects model) 
(Dependent variable: LHW) 
 
  BELGIUM  DENMARK  FRANCE  GERMANY 
  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t 
                 
Constant  1.6062  37.62**  1.7009  42.81**  1.3786  21.68**  1.5061  26.21** 
EDUC1  0.2681  10.01**  0.2222  9.57**  0.5820  14.59**  0.2749  6.94** 
EDUC2  0.0902  2.99**  0.1225  5.12**  0.2164  6.64**  0.0532   1.75*   
POTEXP  0.0069  1.98**  -0.0005  -0.17     0.0055  1.33     0.0064  1.45    
POTEXP2  -0.0001   -0.98        -0.0000  -0.21      -0.0001  -0.58       -0.0002  -2.09** 
SEN  -0.0021   -0.35      0.0024   0.48      0.0177  2.16**  0.0021  0.28     
SEN2  0.0005  1.57      -0.0000  -0.15      -0.0001  -0.21      0.0005  1.24     
UNEMP5  0.0028  0.70      -0.0267  -2.59**  -0.0264  -1.10      -0.0355   -1.80*   
REG1  0.0050  0.14          0.0742     1.79*       
REG2  -0.0140   -0.63               -0.1085  -2.54**     
REG3          -0.0813  -1.28         
REG4          -0.0382  -0.82            
REG5          -0.1331   -2.93**     
REG6          -0.0968  -2.07**     
REG7          -0.0694   -1.43          
REG8                 
REG9                 
REG10                 
D1995  0.0174    1.79*     0.0367  4.42**  0.0222  2.03**  0.0448  3.62** 
D1996  0.0630  6.05**  0.1133  12.99**  0.0296  2.46**  0.0713  5.53** 
                 
 
R
2   
 
0.2226 
   
0.1838 
   
0.3327 
   
0.1112 
 
LM Test  690.73    611.09    885.13    905.21   




-(**) and (*) show a statistical significance at 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
-LM Test = Lagrange Multiplier Test   18
TABLE 3.b 
 
Wage equation estimates (Random effects model) 
(Dependent variable: LHW) 
 
  UNITED 
KINGDOM 
GREECE  IRELAND  ITALY 
  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t 
                 
Constant  1.5623  20.41**  1.0309  15.04**  1.3416  16.94**  1.4100  30.97** 
EDUC1  0.4383  12.77**  0.5541  15.63**  0.7691  13.67**  0.6932  21.20** 
EDUC2  0.1252  3.97**  0.2425    6.08**  0.2741  5.28**  0.3402  15.17** 
POTEXP  0.0067  1.51      0.0112  1.92**   0.0102  1.68*     0.0086  2.47** 
POTEXP2  -0.0002  -2.20**  -0.0002   -0.91       -0.0002   -1.21       -0.0001   -1.05      
SEN  -0.0041   -0.66       -0.0185  -1.82*    0.0065  0.62      0.0221  3.93** 
SEN2  0.0006  1.53      0.0015  2.80**  0.0005  0.90      -0.0008  -2.39** 
UNEMP5  -0.0308  -1.80*     -0.0275   -1.04       -0.0384  -1.69*     -0.0534  -4.21** 
REG1  -0.0670   -0.92       -0.0021   -0.05       0.0214  0.40      -0.0805  -1.88*    
REG2  -0.0314   -0.44       0.0748  1.52          -0.1122  -3.11** 
REG3  -0.0110   -0.16       0.0097  0.22          -0.0153  -0.45     
REG4  -0.0494   -0.60               -0.0157  -0.37     
REG5  0.0865  1.42              -0.0436  -1.14     
REG6  -0.1233  -1.84*             -0.0919  -2.28** 
REG7  -0.0459   -0.67               -0.1368  -2.90** 
REG8  0.0077  0.11              -0.0200  -0.48     
REG9  -0.1009   -1.14               -0.0967  -2.47** 
REG10  0.0046  0.06              -0.0628  -1.34     
D1995  0.0039  0.35      0.0323  2.22**  0.0813  5.30**  -0.0282  -3.38** 
D1996  0.0792  6.78**  0.0204  1.31      0.0852  5.22**  -0.0113  -1.20     






   
0.4188 
   
0.4567 
   
0.3833 
 
LM Test  723.54    411.05    418.24    1400.28   




-(**) and (*) show a statistical significance at 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
-LM Test = Lagrange Multiplier Test 
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TABLE 3.c 
 
Wage equation estimates (Random effects model) 
(Dependent variable: LHW) 
 
  HOLLAND  PORTUGAL  SPAIN 
  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t 
             
Constant  1.7554  46.42**  0.5821  9.49**  1.3464  16.93** 
EDUC1  0.2744  9.41**  1.0762  24.18**  0.6010  15.62** 
EDUC2  0.0551  2.09**  0.4693  10.53**  0.2518  5.50** 
POTEXP  0.0030  1.06      0.0012   0.302      0.0088  1.97** 
POTEXP2  -0.0001   -1.44       -0.0001  -1.75*    -0.0002   -1.59      
SEN  -0.0073   -1.56       0.0346  4.66**  0.0006  0.07     
SEN2  0.0007  2.66**  -0.0002  -0.48      0.0005  1.00     
UNEMP5  -0.0526  -2.46**  -0.0049  -0.51      -0.0738  -3.26** 
REG1      0.0654   1.43      -0.0248   -0.38      
REG2      -0.0086  -0.18      0.0374  0.63     
REG3      0.1228  2.73**  0.1139    1.84*   
REG4      0.0970  1.60      -0.0194   -0.27      
REG5      0.1109  2.05**  0.0541  0.88     
REG6      0.1154  2.33**  0.0626  0.94     
REG7             
REG8             
REG9             
REG10             
D1995  0.0467  6.01**  0.0016  0.15      0.0488  4.18** 
D1996  0.0876  10.88**  0.0229  1.99**  0.1196  9.20** 








   
0.5539 
1093.51 




Observations  1707    1928    1297   
             
Notes: 
 
-(**) and (*) show a statistical significance at 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
-LM Test = Lagrange Multiplier Test 
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TABLE 4.a 
Probit estimates of labour participation (Random effects model) 
(Dependent variable: ACTIVE) 
  BELGIUM  DENMARK  FRANCE  GERMANY 
  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  T  Coefficient  t 
                 
Constant  -60.9771  -14.11**  -76.3882  -12.21**  -52.5090  -16.14**  -22.9163  -15.56** 
PREW  42.1157  15.42**  38.4271  11.42**  38.8843  17.61**  10.7104  24.69** 
FIEW  -0.0004  -5.78**  -0.0013  -13.42**  -0.0008  -9.15**  -0.0005  -8.94** 
BENEFIH   0.7114  0.89        0.9955  1.56       -0.2057  -0.46      -0.0294  -0.08     
AGE  -0.1802  -2.40**  0.8580  8.84**  0.1066  1.47       0.5017  9.00** 
AGE2  -0.0013  -1.49      -0.0106  -9.29**  -0.0041  -4.57**  -0.0065  -9.97** 
EDUC1  -9.3685  -12.83**  -5.9272  -7.94**  -20.5849  -16.23**  -1.3208  -7.00** 
EDUC2  -2.6466  -8.09**  -2.9769  -6.43**  -7.6988  -15.16**  -0.2024  -1.50     
EDUC1H   1.0097     3.65**   0.4764     1.68*     0.2085  0.61       -0.0551  -0.31     
EDUC2H  0.2043     0.88      0.6033     2.23**  0.4415  2.24**  0.0651  0.39      
UNEMPH  -0.4586  -0.21      -0.2118  -0.10      0.1782  0.11       -0.1870  -0.16     
INACTH  -3.1808  -2.03**  -2.4401  -1.44      1.4766  1.16       2.6099  3.08** 
UNEMPH*AGE  -0.0323  -0.63      -0.0363  -0.73      0.0156  0.37       0.0078  0.32      
INACTH*AGE  0.0344  1.13       0.0142    0.47      -0.0429    -1.71*    -0.0648  -4.07** 
DUMHW  0.1606      0.77      0.2325   0.84      0.4702  1.30      0.0790  0.50     
N14  -0.3362  -3.35**  -0.7441  -5.05**  -0.8124  -7.61**  -0.8326  -11.67** 
DUMN12  0.0709  0.34       0.3055  1.15       0.1501  0.86       -0.2272    -1.89*   
REG1  0.3819  0.99           -1.7458  -5.08**     
REG2  0.9214  4.53**      4.6272  11.98**     
REG3          3.0375  7.62**     
REG4          2.0492  6.20**     
REG5          4.9477  12.77**     
REG6          3.9044  10.43**     
REG7          2.9229  8.21**     
REG8                 
REG9                 
REG10                 
D1995  -0.9526  -5.02**  -1.4588  -6.17**  -0.7933  -5.11**  -0.2771  -2.96** 
D1996  -2.6760  -10.65**  -4.3481  -10.74**  -0.8211  -5.73**  -0.3441  -3.40** 
Rho  0.8559  56.99**  0.9034  74.48**  0.8245  45.76**  0.8489  78.21** 
LR1  2434.39  (20 d.f.)  1032.32 (18 d.f.)  4236.06 (25 d.f.)  2572.47 (18 d.f.) 
LR2  631.26 (1 d.f.)  526.37 (1 d.f.)  612.30 (1 d.f.)  1456.34 (1 d.f.) 
Observations  3717    2783    5098    6386   
Notes: 
-LR1 = Log likelihood ratio of pooled model. 
-LR2 = Log likelihood ratio of random model/pooled model. 
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TABLE 4.b 
Probit estimates of labour participation (Random effects model) 
(Dependent variable: ACTIVE) 
  UNITED KINGDOM  GREECE  IRELAND  ITALY 
  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t 
                 
Constant  -22.4976  -9.26**  -12.1436  -14.80**  -21.1124  -11.27**  -11.6166  -12.95** 
PREW  10.8554  7.34**  10.2218  21.66**  19.6250  15.39**  5.7920  46.30** 
FIEW  -0.0002  -4.58**  -0.0001  -4.72**  -0.0004  -6.45**  -0.0002  -10.87** 
BENEFIH  0.4352    1.21      -0.0981  -0.35      0.1198  0.40       0.1072  0.25      
AGE  0.4852  7.05**  0.1157  3.59**  -0.2119  -3.17**  0.2204  5.50** 
AGE2  -0.0063  -7.79**  -0.0021  -5.81**  0.0008  1.02      -0.0037  -7.91** 
EDUC1  -3.1867  -4.79**  -4.0372  -13.12**  -13.0580  -13.68**  -0.9809  -3.53** 
EDUC2  -0.4666    -1.75*    -2.2073  -12.60**  -4.9647  -12.84**  -0.3260    -2.62*   
EDUC1H  -0.5982  -2.65**  -0.1040  -0.67      1.1441  3.87**  0.3477  1.60      
EDUC2H  -0.1367  -0.65      -0.1831  -1.47      0.9849  5.16**  0.3167  2.72** 
UNEMPH  -0.7904  -0.65      0.3659  0.59       -1.8671  -1.97**  1.5756  2.60** 
INACTH  -0.5033  -0.47      0.6094  0.99       -1.9465  -2.37**  3.6946  5.05** 
UNEMPH*AGE  -0.0195  -0.72      -0.0029  -0.19      0.0330       1.52      -0.0268  -1.74** 
INACTH*AGE  -0.0335  -1.58      -0.0302  -2.66**  0.0209    1.23      -0.0826  -5.82** 
DUMHW  0.3645      1.93*    0.2955  1.53       0.4880  2.78**  0.0436    0.34     
N14  -0.9132  -9.46**  -0.1083   -1.94*     -0.5362  -6.89**  -0.4189  -6.83** 
DUMN12  0.0478  0.27       -0.1394    -1.68*    -0.0938  -0.64      0.0415    0.41     
REG1  0.2061  0.37       -0.0092  -0.07      -0.0929  -0.38      1.0021  4.08** 
REG2  0.1304  0.26       -0.3150  -2.20**      1.0935  5.04** 
REG3  -0.3510  -0.73      -0.5290  -3.71**      0.5057  2.45** 
REG4  -0.4667  -0.88              1.3852  4.90** 
REG5  -1.4582  -3.31**          0.8320  3.97** 
REG6  2.1864  4.42**          0.9012  3.77** 
REG7  0.1338  0.27               1.5194  6.59** 
REG8  0.0039  0.01                 0.6845  3.23** 
REG9  -0.1978  -0.37              0.4664  2.25** 
REG10  -0.9721  -2.11**          -0.1767   -0.79     
D1995  0.1832  1.25         -0.3726  -5.53**    -1.2074  -7.53**  0.2890  3.57** 
D1996  -0.5224  -3.01**  -0.4380  -6.58**  -1.2288  -8.62**  0.1823  2.31** 
Rho  0.8659  67.02**  0.7768  64.11**  0.8399  59.02**  0.8641  115.97** 
LR1  1357.90  (28 d.f.)  2360.60 (21 d.f.)  1622.71 (19 d.f.)  5175.64 (28 d.f.) 
LR2  791.14 (1 d.f.)  1772.48 (1 d.f.)  807.49 (1 d.f.)  2331.98 (1 d.f.) 
Observations  3692    8099    3598    10746   
Notes: 
-LR1 = Log likelihood ratio of pooled model. 
-LR2 = Log likelihood ratio of random model/pooled model. 
-(**) and (*) show a statistical significance at 5 and 10 per cent, respectively.   22
TABLE 4.c 
Probit estimates of labour participation (Random effects model) 
(Dependent variable: ACTIVE) 
  HOLLAND  PORTUGAL  SPAIN 
  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t 
             
Constant  -11.1556  -2.19**  -5.5135  -4.73**  -8.2028  -9.25** 
PREW  8.2611  2.99**  17.7985  17.26**  3.6644  13.49** 
FIEW  -0.0007  -6.62**  -0.0005  -5.58**  -0.0003  -8.65** 
BENEFIH  0.9341   0.83       -0.5523  -1.29      -0.0976  -0.61     
AGE  0.2093  2.75**  -0.1628  -3.46**  0.2108  5.32** 
AGE2  -0.0048  -5.34**  0.0016  3.00**  -0.0033  -7.21** 
EDUC1  0.0096    0.01      -15.6977  -11.84**  0.5813  2.31** 
EDUC2  -0.0359  -0.15      -8.3545  -13.17**  0.1151  0.66      
EDUC1H  1.5910  4.70**  -0.8035  -1.29      0.1204  0.71      
EDUC2H  0.5290  2.03**  0.7190     1.74*     0.0371  0.24      
UNEMPH  -2.5035  -0.46      1.8451    1.21      0.6361  1.51      
INACTH  3.5525  2.27**  1.8426      1.73*    1.6005  2.82** 
UNEMPH*AGE  0.0191  0.15       -0.0269  -0.83      -0.0075  -0.76     
INACTH*AGE  -0.0932  -3.09**  -0.0517  -2.74**  -0.0371  -3.35** 
DUMHW  0.5271  1.51       0.5382    -1.43      0.2826  2.35** 
N14  -0.3639  -3.53**  -0.2062  -2.49**  -0.2119  -3.65** 
DUMN12  -0.9952    -5.37**  -0.2818    -2.04**  -0.0502  -0.58     
REG1      -1.4246  -4.72**  0.8634  3.95** 
REG2      0.3219    1.10      0.4279     1.87** 
REG3      -3.1197  -9.71**  -0.0279  -0.12     
REG4      -1.9258  -6.00**  -0.2521  -1.14     
REG5      -2.5607  -7.70**  0.5092  2.41** 
REG6      -4.2946  -14.37**  -0.2332  -1.09     
REG7             
REG8             
REG9             
REG10             
D1995  -0.4877  -2.29**  0.6871  6.19**  0.0708  0.94     
D1996  -0.4075  -1.44      0.3161  3.09**  -0.3686  -4.52** 
Rho  0.9046  95.85**  0.8331  58.92**  0.8074  73.49** 
LR1  1657.78  (18 d.f.)  4645.74 (24 d.f.)  2491.70 (24 d.f.) 
LR2  1024.37 (1 d.f.)  1037.96 (1 d.f.)  1872.35 (1 d.f.) 
Observations  3838    6929    8309   
Notes: 
-LR1 = Log likelihood ratio of pooled model. 
-LR2 = Log likelihood ratio of random model/pooled model. 







  BELGIUM  DENMARK 
  n=3717  n=1587   n=2783  n=1643 
Variables  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D. 
                 
LHW      1.912  0.312      1.889  0.245 
EDUC1  0.324  0.468  0.499  0.500  0.369  0.483  0.466  0.499 
EDUC2  0.284  0.451  0.257  0.437  0.340  0.474  0.340  0.474 
POTEXP      14.919  9.737      20.718  11.263 
POTEXP2      317.226  346.838      555.998  510.296 
SEN      10.328  5.251      9.754  5.115 
SEN2      138.240  104.015      128.342  103.197 
UNEMP5      0.381  2.639      0.296  0.861 
ACTIVE  0.638  0.481      0.784  0.411     
PREW  1.844  0.141      1.853  0.115     
FIEW  1761.419  988.124      1612.742  880.568     
AGE  42.738  11.141      45.401  10.410     
AGE2  1950.669  1005.153      2169.571  955.989     
EDUC1H  0.327  0.469      0.378  0.485     
EDUC2H  0.316  0.465      0.397  0.489     
BENEFIH  0.026  0.158      0.034  0.181     
UNEMPH  0.019  0.135      0.023  0.151     
INACTH  0.196  0.397      0.142  0.349     
DUMHW  0.090  0.287      0.117  0.322     
N14  0.882  1.109      0.707  0.977     
DUMN12  0.301  0.459      0.246  0.431     
                 





  FRANCE  GERMANY 
  n=5098  n=1713  n=6386  n=2181 
Variables  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D. 
                 
LHW      1.793  0.435      1.716  0.415 
EDUC1  0.147  0.354  0.224  0.417  0.124  0.329  0.184  0.388 
EDUC2  0.345  0.475  0.431  0.495  0.523  0.500  0.539  0.499 
POTEXP      16.899  11.517      21.082  11.225 
POTEXP2      418.148  453.492      570.371  502.127 
SEN      9.914  5.191      9.338  5.541 
SEN2      127.976  104.187      123.601  107.773 
UNEMP5      0.207  0.615      0.216  0.690 
ACTIVE  0.542  0.498      0.616  0.486     
PREW  1.638  0.255      1.622  0.147     
FIEW  1541.319  917.550      1831.433  909.437     
AGE  46.037  11.552      45.422  11.158     
AGE2  2252.975  1072.282      2187.618  1019.825     
EDUC1H  0.153  0.360      0.333  0.471     
EDUC2H  0.419  0.493      0.475  0.499     
BENEFIH  0.019  0.138      0.021  0.142     
UNEMPH  0.027  0.161      0.020  0.141     
INACTH  0.312  0.463      0.214  0.410     
DUMHW  0.034  0.180      0.062  0.241     
N14  0.761  1.079      0.612  0.932     
DUMN12  0.245  0.430      0.225  0.418     
                 





  UNITED KINGDOM  GREECE 
  n=3692  n=1637  n=8099  n=1146 
Variables  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D. 
                 
LHW      1.790  0.397      1.487  0.425 
EDUC1  0.229  0.420  0.291  0.455  0.142  0.349  0.448  0.497 
EDUC2  0.353  0.478  0.387  0.487  0.204  0.403  0.251  0.434 
POTEXP      22.318  11.168      13.053  8.194 
POTEXP2      622.722  526.668      237.463  260.633 
SEN      7.649  5.015      10.129  4.978 
SEN2      87.841  95.001      130.363  100.164 
UNEMP5      0.229  0.774      0.178  0.592 
ACTIVE  0.696  0.460      0.460  0.498     
PREW  1.736  0.211      1.295  0.212     
FIEW  1860.081  1983.116      1134.196  937.513     
AGE  44.499  11.217      44.965  11.683     
AGE2  2105.986  1013.998      2158.304  1052.353     
EDUC1H  0.303  0.460      0.167  0.373     
EDUC2H  0.333  0.471      0.232  0.422     
BENEFIH  0.017  0.130      0.007  0.082     
UNEMPH  0.047  0.212      0.026  0.159     
INACTH  0.163  0.369      0.228  0.419     
DUMHW  0.110  0.313      0.027  0.162     
N14  0.730  1.023      0.653  0.899     
DUMN12  0.253  0.435      0.241  0.428     
                 





  IRELAND  ITALY 
  n=3598  n=840  n=10746  n=2760 
Variables  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D. 
                 
LHW      1.976  0.472      1.829  0.418 
EDUC1  0.112  0.316  0.286  0.452  0.058  0.234  0.137  0.344 
EDUC2  0.380  0.486  0.521  0.500  0.277  0.447  0.522  0.500 
POTEXP      15.445  9.941      16.589  9.659 
POTEXP2      337.260  400.661      368.468  361.131 
SEN      9.418  5.087      11.189  5.487 
SEN2      119.124  99.976      159.169  106.983 
UNEMP5      0.207  0.875      0.233  0.817 
ACTIVE  0.425  0.494      0.452  0.498     
PREW  1.723  0.272      1.585  0.301     
FIEW  1575.889  1024.281      1519.538  1707.253     
AGE  45.653  10.803      45.591  10.702     
AGE2  2200.860  986.971      2193.114  977.870     
EDUC1H  0.126  0.332      0.072  0.259     
EDUC2H  0.301  0.459      0.287  0.453     
BENEFIH  0.083  0.275      0.004  0.062     
UNEMPH  0.070  0.255      0.027  0.163     
INACTH  0.211  0.408      0.251  0.434     
DUMHW  0.083  0.275      0.066  0.248     
N14  1.073  1.297      0.575  0.826     
DUMN12  0.297  0.475      0.226  0.418     
                 





  HOLLAND  PORTUGAL 
  n=3838  n=1707  n=6929  n=1928 
Variables  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D. 
                 
LHW      1.919  0.437      1.141  0.578 
EDUC1  0.167  0.374  0.269  0.442  0.042  0.201  0.123  0.328 
EDUC2  0.603  0.489  0.608  0.490  0.059  0.236  0.123  0.328 
POTEXP      14.726  10.371      18.492  11.669 
POTEXP2      316.579  380.954      478.055  544.398 
SEN      8.172  4.976      10.381  5.278 
SEN2      95.175  95.543      138.849  107.480 
UNEMP5      0.153  0.412      0.322  1.530 
ACTIVE  0.683  0.465      0.579  0.494     
PREW  1.882  0.104      0.830  0.371     
FIEW  1612.104  654.317      949.058  659.063     
AGE  44.266  10.753      46.065  11.360     
AGE2  2074.940  979.822      2251.005  1042.608     
EDUC1H  0.233  0.424      0.035  0.184     
EDUC2H  0.631  0.483      0.063  0.243     
BENEFIH  0.006  0.075      0.014  0.117     
UNEMPH  0.011  0.106      0.019  0.137     
INACTH  0.220  0.414      0.186  0.389     
DUMHW  0.069  0.253      0.016  0.124     
N14  0.673  0.986      0.645  0.906     
DUMN12  0.237  0.426      0.237  0.426     
                 






  SPAIN 
  n=8309  n=1297 
Variables  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D. 
         
LHW      1.907  0.467 
EDUC1  0.120  0.325  0.463  0.499 
EDUC2  0.112  0.315  0.210  0.408 
POTEXP      16.461  10.658 
POTEXP2      384.481  431.609 
SEN      10.779  5.100 
SEN2      145.412  103.936 
UNEMP5      0.278  0.762 
ACTIVE  0.403  0.491     
PREW  1.577  0.253     
FIEW  1404.320  902.335     
AGE  43.117  11.452     
AGE2  2257.952  1054.743     
EDUC1H  0.153  0.360     
EDUC2H  0.130  0.336     
BENEFIH  0.055  0.228     
UNEMPH  0.078  0.269     
INACTH  0.262  0.440     
DUMHW  0.070  0.255     
N14  0.656  0.880     
DUMN12  0.262  0.440     
         
 
 